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The Economics of the “China Price”
Peter Navarro
Introduction 
“The China price”(…) the three scariest words in
US industry. Cut your price at least 30% or lose
your customers. Nearly every manufacturer is
vulnerable -- from furniture to networking gear.
The result: a massive shift in economic power is
underway.
Business Week1
1 Given China’s demonstrated ability to conquer one export market after another,  an
important question for both would-be competitors and world policy-makers weighing
up various protectionist measures is this: How has China been able to emerge as the
world’s “factory floor”? The answer lies in the eight major “economic drivers” of the
China price: low wages, counterfeiting and piracy, minimal worker health and safety
regulations, lax environmental regulations and enforcement, export industry subsidies,
a highly efficient “industrial network clustering”, the catalytic role of foreign direct
investment (FDI), An undervalued currency.
2 These drivers have been identified from research conducted as part of the “China price
Project” at the Merage School of Business, UC-Irvine (described in the Appendix). This
article seeks to derive estimates of the relative contributions of each of these eight
drivers to China’s competitive advantage. The United States manufacturing sector is
used as the benchmark for comparison. The analysis yields several important insights
for both policy-makers and management strategists.
3 First, the determination of the China price extends well beyond issues of cheap labour,
currency  misalignments,  and  a  lax  environmental  regime―the  “usual  suspects”  in
many trade debates. Second, there are important synergies between many of the China
price  drivers.  For  example,  both  an  undervalued  currency  and  export  industry
subsidies  help  attract  additional  FDI,  which  in  turn,  facilitates  industrial  network
clustering. Finally, aspects of many of the China price drivers appear to fall outside the
norms of international trade agreements (e.g.  the World Trade Organisation (WTO))
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and/or international standards for environmental protection and worker health and
safety.
4 These findings  have  important  implications  for  companies  and  their  management
strategists seeking ways to compete with China and facing decisions about outsourcing
and offshoring  production activities  to  China.  The  findings  have  equally  important
implications  for  world  policy-makers  (and  therefore  corporate,  environmental  and
labour lobbyists)  seeking ways to counter the many sharp competitive edges of the
China price and its threat to domestic employment, income, the global environment
and labour market. 
Data and methodology
5 The cost structure of the typical US manufacturing firm is used as the benchmark of
comparison. At the outset, two important limitations of the analysis are noted.
6 First,  cost  structures  across  individual  manufacturing  sectors  are  likely  to  vary
substantially. For example, textile manufacturing is highly capital intensive while the
apparel made from finished textiles is highly labour intensive. 
7 A second issue of comparability arises because US and Chinese manufacturing entities
tend to be concentrated in different industries. For example, while the United States
has a large aircraft industry, China does not. This limitation not withstanding, it may
still  be  useful  to  look  at  how  the  four  major  components  of  a  typical  production
function―land,  labour,  capital  and  energy―are  deployed  in  the  two  respective
countries as a means of identifying the sources and size of any competitive advantages.
8 This US cost structure has been developed from multiple sources, including, but not
limited to, data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers of the US Census Bureau, the
Industry Economic Accounts of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis,  the Compustat
database,  Blackfriar’s  Communications  for  marketing  data,  Gartner  for  software
expenditures,  and  Technology  Review  for  data  on  research  and  development
expenditures. 2 This cost structure is summarised in Table 1,  which reports relative
costs  by  the  percentage  of  a  dollar  of  manufacturing  output.  For  example,  raw
materials represent 46 cents on the US manufacturing dollar, labour costs represent 21
cents, advertising and marketing 9 cents, and so on.
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1. The U.S. Manufacturing Cost Structure Dollar
9 The analysis  that  follows illustrates  how each of  the eight  economic drivers  of  the
China  price  reduce  one  or  more  of  the  components  of  the  total  cost  for  Chinese
manufacturers. For the six of the eight drivers in the list above, the cost impacts may
be directly measured, e.g., lower labour costs in China directly reduce the labour cost
component, lower regulatory compliance costs reduce environmental and health and
safety costs. However, for two economic drivers in the list, FDI and the impacts of an
undervalued currency, the cost impacts are of a more indirect or aggregate nature and
require a different approach to valuation. 
Driver #1: Low wages for high quality work
What is stunning about China is that for the first
time we have a huge, poor country that can
compete both with very low wages and in high
tech. Combine the two, and America has a
problem.
Professor Richard Freeman, Harvard
University3
10 The available data on wages and compensation in China is scant and of poor quality.
Many enterprises regularly underreport data to avoid taxation and payments to social
insurance  and  often  keep  two  sets  of  books  for  “management  accounts”  and  “tax
accounts.”4 Acknowledging  such  large  variances,  this  analysis  relies  on  the  best
available  data  compiled  by  Judith  Banister  (2005),5 who  has  calculated  an  average
hourly compensation rate of $0.57.
11 This rate is not the lowest in the world. However, the productivity of Chinese workers
is considerably higher than many other lower wage nations. Accordingly, to properly
estimate the cost advantage of China’s low hourly compensation, it must be adjusted
for productivity.6 
12 Using supplementary data provided by the US Conference Board,  Table 2 compares
hourly compensation in the US and China on a productivity-adjusted basis. It illustrates
that China’s hourly compensation costs are about one-fifth of those in the United States
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(18%).7 This suggests that Chinese manufacturers save 17 cents on the manufacturing
dollar for labour costs relative to their US competitors.
 
2. Productivity-adjusted Compensation Rates in China
13 In  most  cases,  the  wage  advantage  of  a  developing  country  disappears,  or  at  least
narrows considerably, over time as it experiences rapid economic growth and labour
markets tighten. How long this advantage is likely to persist is an open question. 
14 Short-term downward pressure on wages is being exerted by a large “reserve army” of
unemployed workers estimated to be anywhere from 100 million to 200 million. Many
of these workers have been laid off or furloughed (xiagang) as a consequence of the
privatisation of inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs). They have become part of a
larger “floating population” of migrants. With labour unions banned in China, there
likewise has been no emergence of any bargaining power for worker units.
15 Longer term, the heavier counterweight to rising wages is  China’s  official  policy of
rapid urbanisation to combat chronic rural poverty. The Chinese government is seeking
to  move  as  many  as  five hundred  million  peasants  off  the  farm  and  into  China’s
factories over the next several decades. To put these numbers into perspective, the
combined current workforces of the United States and Europe number less than 400
million. Thus, despite unprecedented rates of economic growth, wage pressures in
China  are  unlikely  to  significantly  rise  soon,  making  low  wages  a  significant  and
perennial component of the China price for decades to come.
16 As  to  the  timeframe  in  which  productivity-adjusted  wages  may  rise,  recent  data
suggests that nominal wages may be rising quite quickly (10%-15% a year since 1999.
Because  productivity  has  been  rising  at  a  faster  rate,  unit  labour  costs  remain  in
decline. 
17 Note, however, this decline in unit labour costs is largely a function of the high rate of
entry into the labourforce. This rate of entry will be at its peak from now until about
2011 and then should start to decline. 
18 Once new entrants into the labourforce start to decline significantly, it is quite possible
that unit labour costs will start to rise since businesses will have to pay more to retain
workers for longer.  Thus productivity-adjusted Chinese wages could start  to rise as
early as in the next decade.
Driver #2: Piracy & counterfeiting 
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China is the epicenter of the counterfeits boom….
Just a few years ago, counterfeiting was all Gucci
bags and fake perfume. Now it's everything. It has
just exploded. It is many times larger a problem
than it was only a few years ago. The counterfeit
inventory ranges from cigarette lighters to
automobiles to pharmaceutical fakes that can
endanger a life. I would bet that there are
companies in this country [the US] that don't
even know they're getting screwed around the
world. 
Frank Vargo, National Association of
Manufacturers8
19 “Piracy” refers to the unauthorised production, distribution or use of a good or service.
The goal of a pirate is to create a look-alike “knockoff” that can be sold to a customer as
such. “Counterfeiting” involves trying to pass off the pirated products as that of the
real, branding corporation. Thus, a golf club that looks like a Callaway driver but has a
name like “Hallaway” is a pirated knockoff, whereas as knockoff sold as a “Callaway”
club is a counterfeit.
20 The World Customs Organisation estimates that counterfeiting accounts for 5% to 7% of
global merchandise trade and represents the equivalent in lost sales annually of around
US$500 billion.9 Such counterfeiting costs the pharmaceutical industry alone close to
US$50  billion  a  year,  the  auto  industry  more  than US$10  billion  annually,  and the
software and entertainment industries billions more.10 
21 China is not the only country engaged in this half a trillion dollar trade. Other hotbeds
include Russia, India, Vietnam and South Africa. However, China is considered to be the
largest pirate nation; it accounts for an estimated two-thirds of all the world’s pirated
and counterfeited goods and 80% of all counterfeit goods seized at US borders. 
22 Despite tough rhetoric from the Chinese government, many critics have argued that
much  of  the  country’s  counterfeiting  and  piracy  is  state-sanctioned.  As  noted  by
numerous  scholars,  such  institutionalised  violations  of  international  intellectual
property rights laws and treaties create millions of jobs, help to control inflation, and
boost the standard of living of hundreds of millions of Chinese consumers. The question
for this analysis is what impact might Chinese piracy and counterfeiting have on the
China price.  To answer this  question,  three of  the most  important  elements  of  the
counterfeiting  and  piracy  cost  equation―software  piracy,  reduced  marketing  and
advertising  expenses,  and  lower  capital  expenditures  on  research  and
development―are examined.
23 The rate of software piracy in China is well over 90%. This provides substantial savings
in both the operating and capital budget portions of the balance sheet for most Chinese
enterprises. Based on data published by Gartner, US companies spend, on average, 0.3%
of their overall budget on software.11 Assuming a piracy rate of 90%, this suggests that a
China  price  savings  of  a  little  less  than  one-third  of  a  cent  relative  to  the  US
manufacturing dollar.
24 In  addition,  Chinese  counterfeiters  need  not  incur  either  significant  research  and
development expenditures or substantial advertising and marketing costs to promote
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their  “brand”.  As  noted  by  A.T.  Kearney,  “counterfeiting  allows  skipping  the
investment necessary to create, develop and market products and go directly to profits.
No R&D headaches. No brand building. No advertising.”12 (As a counterpoint argument
here, it is useful to note that it has also frequently argued that this failure to develop
branding and intellectual property depresses the value of Chinese-made products and
limits the markets in which they can be sold.)
25 A study conducted by Blackfriar’s Communications of companies of all sizes and across
many industries suggests that an average of roughly 9% of revenues are devoted to
marketing expenses.13 To translate this  into an effect  on the China price,  it  is  first
necessary  to  assume  that  some  fraction  of  the  Chinese  GDP  is  attributable  to
counterfeiting and piracy activity. Oded Shenkar (2005) reports estimates that range
between 10% and 30%.14 This suggests that 0.9% to 2.7% of the China price advantage or
a mid-range of 1.8 cents on the manufacturing dollar may be attributed, on average, to
the lack of marketing expenses for pirated goods. 
26 A similar  calculation may be  made for  industrial  research and development (R&D).
Industries  such  as  autos,  biotechnology,  semiconductors  and  pharmaceuticals  are
particularly R&D-intensive, with R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue in the
range of 15% or more. More broadly, based on sector-level data reported by Technology
Review, the weighted average of R&D spending across all sectors of the global economy
is estimated to be 8.5%.15 This suggests that 0.85% to 2.55% may be attributed to the
absence of R&D expenditure for counterfeit goods, or a mid-range of 1.7 cents on the
manufacturing dollar. That leaves a mid-range total of 3.77 cents on the manufacturing
dollar that Chinese manufacturers save because of counterfeiting and piracy.
27 This is likely to be a conservative estimate. There are also more diffuse cost savings and
it is far more difficult to estimate effects of counterfeiting and piracy not accounted for
in these calculations. For example, legitimate companies face warranty costs,  which
often  must  be  honoured  even  when  a  counterfeit  part  leads  to  failure.  Legitimate
companies  also  often  incur  costs  of  protecting  their  own  intellectual  property.
Companies like Nike, Louis Vuitton, Microsoft and IBM now spend considerable sums
on IP protection. They also suffer damage to their good will and reputation when
counterfeit products fail (and fail to be recognised as counterfeits).
Driver #3: Minimal worker health and safety regulations
Yongkang, in prosperous Zhejiang province just
south of Shanghai, is the hardware capital of
China. Its 7,000 metal-working factories―all
privately owned―make hinges, hubcaps, pots
and pans, power drills, security doors, tool boxes,
thermoses, electric razors, headphones, plugs,
fans and just about anything else with metallic
innards. 
Yongkang, which means "eternal health" in
Chinese, is also the dismemberment capital of
China. At least once a day someone... is rushed to
one of the dozen clinics that specialize in treating
hand, arm and finger injuries, according to local
government statistics.... The reality, all over
China, is that workplace casualties have become
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endemic. Nationally, 140,000 people died in work-
related accidents last year… according to the
State Administration of Work Safety. Hundreds of
thousands more were injured.
The New York Times16
28 While  the  Chinese  government  instituted  new  health  and  safety  laws  in  1995,  few
enterprises,  either  public  or  private,  abide  by  the  laws.  There  is  also  very  little
enforcement by either the central government or local and provincial  governments
because the goal  of  economic growth has taken precedence.  Nor does any properly
functioning legal  system exist  to  protect  workers  and insure fair  compensation for
those who are injured so the legal liabilities of Chinese manufacturing enterprises are
very limited.
29 As a result, according even to China’s own under-reported statistics, China is one of the
most  dangerous  places  to  work  in  the  world.  The  highest  risk  industries  include
building materials,  chemicals,  coal  production,  machinery  manufacture,  metallurgy,
plastics and textiles.  Diseases ranging from silicosis  and brown lung to a variety of
cancers caused by the ingestion, inhalation or contact with toxic chemicals and waste
are endemic. Workplace injuries are endemic.
30 In this regard, there are those who may legitimately argue that the current relatively
lax worker safety and environmental enforcement is a natural feature of China’s stage
of  industrial  development.  In  this  regard,  it  is  unlikely  that  China’s  lax  regulatory
environment  is  any  worse  than  in  the  United  States,  Europe  or  even  Japan  at
comparable earlier stages of their development. While this may be true, it is likely also
true that this lax regulatory environment provides a cost advantage relative to other
countries whose regulatory regimes are tighter. The goal of this analysis is simply to
provide some albeit rough measure of this advantage.
31 As for the cost advantages to Chinese manufacturers inherent in a lax health and safety
regulatory regime, these range from the use of cheaper equipment for workers and
fewer safety-related expenses to savings on training and safety-related large capital
expenditures. For example, Chinese textile companies are unlikely to invest in anti-
noise  or  dust  control  equipment.  Chinese coal  mining companies  tend to skimp on
masks, goggles, and emergency rescue facilities while a wet drilling system costs as
much as 60% more than a dry drilling system but significantly reduces hazardous dust
emissions. 
32 One way to estimate the cost advantage of China’s lack of adequate health and safety
regulations is  to compare the expenditures on regulatory compliance in the United
States  versus  China  at  the  aggregate level.  Specifically,  the  cost  of  regulatory
compliance in the United States as a percentage of some relative metric, e.g., total cost
or total revenue, can be used as a benchmark of comparison. Then, some fraction of
that  cost  can  be  subtracted  from  the  Chinese  cost  equation  based  on  the  looser
standards. 
33 A joint study by Mark Crain and Joseph Johnson (2001) was used as the US benchmark.
It estimates health and safety compliance costs in the United States to be 1.6% of gross
revenues.17 Under the conservative assumption that China spends a third of what the
United  States  spends,  this  suggests  that  the  contribution  of  lax  health  and  safety
The Economics of the “China Price”
China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006
7
standards to the “China price” may be rather modest (the extreme pain and suffering
of Chinese workers notwithstanding)―about one cent on the manufacturing dollar 
Driver #4: Lax environmental regulations and enforcement
China’s population is so big and its resources so
scarce that if we continue to ignore our
environmental problems, that will bring disaster
for us and the world.
Pan Yue, Deputy Director, Chinese State
Environmental Protection Administration18 
34 China is rapidly becoming one of the most polluted countries in the world. It is home to
16 of the 20 the world’s most polluted cities. Of its almost one hundred cities with over
a million people each, two-thirds fail  to meet World Health Organisation (WHO) air
quality standards. 
35 China  is  also  the  world  leader  in  the  sulphur  dioxide  emissions  and  produces  the
second highest  CO2 emissions.  It  releases  six  hundred tons  of  mercury into  the air
annually, nearly one-quarter of the world’s non-natural emissions,19 and it is the world
leader in the generation of substances that deplete the world’s ozone layer. Acid rain,
which severely  damages  forests,  fisheries,  and crops,  affects  one-quarter  of  China’s
land area and one-third of its agricultural land. As much as 50% of the acid rain in
Japan  and  Korea  is  of  Chinese  origin.  According  to  the  Chinese  Academy  on
Environmental Planning, more than 400,000 Chinese die prematurely from air pollution
related diseases, primarily from lung and heart disease.20 That number is expected to
reach more than 500,000 within a decade. 
36 The statistics on water pollution are equally stark. Of China’s seven major rivers 70%
are severely polluted, and 80% fail to meet standards for fishing.21 90% of China’s cities
and 75% of  its  lakes  suffer  from some degree of  water  pollution,22 and 700 million
Chinese “have access to drinking water of a quality below WHO standards.”23 Liver and
stomach cancers related to water pollution are among the leading causes of death in
the countryside. 24 All of China’s coastal waters are moderately to highly polluted. 25
37 Not  all  of  China’s  air  and  water  pollution  can  be  blamed  on  its  manufacturing
industries.  Other  major  sources  include  pesticide  and  fertiliser  runoff  in  the
agricultural sector and large quantities of human and animal waste that are dumped
into waterways or seep into ground water. However, China’s industrial sector is the
primary contributor of toxic (versus organic) pollution. 
38 The  worst  polluting  industries  include  paper  and  pulp,  food,  chemicals,  textiles,
tanning, and mining. The most common toxic pollutants include dioxins, solvents, and
PCBs, various metals such as mercury, lead, and copper and highly persistent pesticides
ranging from chlordane and mirex to DDT.26 
39 Many of  the polluting factories  are  small-scale  and locally  owned.  Even when such
enterprises are highly unprofitable, they represent important job generators in rural
areas  plagued  by  high  unemployment.  That  makes  it  very  difficult  for  a  local
environmental  protection  bureau  to  either  close  the  polluters  down,  fine  them,  or
otherwise force them to comply with the pollution control standards. 
40 In  addition,  in  many  cases,  large  factories  equipped  with  the  latest  and  most
sophisticated pollution control technologies simply do not use the technologies for fear
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of driving up production costs. Typically, this is done without any fear of sanctions by
lax regulators and often complicit local officials.
41 While China has some strict environmental laws on the books, the fines that may be
levied to enforce the regulations are so insignificant that they are seen merely as a cost
of doing business rather than a true deterrent. Local authorities that collect the fines
will often recycle the revenues back to the polluters as tax breaks. 
42 A  major  problem  with  enforcement  is  that  China’s  state  environmental  protection
agency (EPA) is critically understaffed and under-budgeted. While the US EPA employs
close  to  20,000,27 China’s  SEPA employs  only  300.  This  is  to  oversee  environmental
protection in a country with over a billion people and with close to 100 cities of  a
million people or more. Finally, as with its weak health and safety regime, China’s legal
system makes it extremely difficult for pollution victims to properly seek any redress. 
43 China’s lax environmental regulations and weak enforcement provide a variety of cost
advantages to its industrial sector. Enterprises save money by not buying protective
equipment for workers. Many do not need to invest in pollution control technologies
while those that do save money by not investing in them. Their waste disposal costs are
thus considerably reduced. 
44 The impact of these cost advantages on the China price may be estimated in two ways.
First, in a variation on the approach taken earlier in measuring the impact of a lax
health and safety regulatory regime, the costs of environmental regulatory compliance
in China can be compared to that in the United States at the aggregate level under the
assumption that Chinese manufacturers spend a fraction of what US firms do. Second,
the results  may be cross-checked by comparing actual  expenditures of  a  few select
Chinese and US firms in the same industries. 
45 Using  the  first  approach,  Blodgett  (1997)  provides  a  summary  of  pollution  control
compliance costs in the United States that accounts for both capital expenditure and
pollution abatement operating costs.28 As a percent of value added, costs vary widely
across industries. They range as high as 17% for petroleum, 9% for pulp mills, and 4%
for chemicals to less than 1% for industries such as food, textiles and printing, with an
overall average of 1.48%. Again assuming that China spends one-third of the amount
that  the United States  spends,  this  suggests  an effect  of  environmental  compliance
costs on the China price very similar to that of lax health and safety regulations of just
about  one cent  on the manufacturing dollar  (albeit  considerably  higher  for  certain
industries).29 
46 Using the  second approach,  Table  3  compares  annual  environmental  expenses  as  a
percentage of gross revenues and costs for two pairs of companies in the relatively high
polluting chemical and steel industries in China and the United States.30 
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3. A Comparison of Environmental Compliance Costs in the Steel & Chemical Industries
47 US Steel reports spending roughly 3% of its revenues on environmental expenses. By
comparison, China’s Bao Steel spends only about one-tenth as much. The figures for
Dow  Chemical  versus  China’s  Sinopec  are  similar.  This  data  lends  support  to the
assertion that the assumption that China spends one-third that of the United States on
regulatory compliance is a conservative one.
48 One final  observation may be useful  here.  This  relatively  small  contribution to  the
China price notwithstanding, China’s environmental cost advantages at the individual
enterprise level are likely being offset to a significant degree by the aggregate social
costs. The World Bank estimates that pollution annually costs China between 8% and
12% of its more than US$1 trillion GDP in terms of increased medical bills, lost work due
to illness, damage to fish and crops, money spent on disaster relief, and so on.31 The
useful policy point to make here is that a cost-benefit analysis would likely suggest that
China could significantly improve its environmental regime without significant loss of
competitive advantage and that the benefits of such a reform would likely far outweigh
the costs.
Driver #5: Export subsidies 
The subsidization of manufacturing by the
Chinese government extends beyond what might
be considered normal bounds to even include the
acquisition of raw materials. A fellow NAM
[National Association of Manufacturers] member
in the copper industry tells us that exports of
copper and brass scrap to China have increased
about 50% a year for several years, driven in large
part by a special subsidy of 30% of the VAT tax
applied by the Chinese government to imports of
scrap. This subsidy is given to the scrap consumer
to invest in upgrading facilities. This subsidy
amounts to about seven cents a pound of the
copper content in a market where the successful
bidder may be determined by a margin of a
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quarter cent.
Al Lubrano, President, Technical Materials,
Inc.32
China's state-run banks have routinely extended
loans to state-owned-enterprises that are not
expected to be repaid. And right now, the big four
state banks in China are, for all practical
purposes, insolvent.
US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission33 
Under state control, many Chinese state-owned
manufacturers are operating with the benefit of
state-sponsored subsidies, including: rent,
utilities, raw materials, transportation, and
telecommunications services. That is not how we
define a level playing field.
US Department of Commerce Secretary Donald
Evans34
49 As a condition of entry into the WTO, the Chinese government promised to eliminate,
or  greatly  scale  back,  the  complex  web  of  subsidies  and  tax  preferences  that  had
benefited export manufacturers in the decade or more preceding its  entry into the
WTO in 2002. Because the Chinese government has not been fully transparent about its
compliance with this condition, it is difficult to determine the degree to which this
condition  has  been  met.  Some  evidence  does,  however,  suggest  some  potentially
significant non-compliance. 
50 First,  energy  and  water  remain  heavily  subsidised.35 Many  manufacturers  likewise
benefit from subsidised rent and/or cheap or free land and preferential access to land
by local and regional governments. Assuming a subsidy level of one-third of the total
costs for these cost components, this would add a modest 1.38 cents to the China price
advantage.36 
51 Second, and of potentially more import, China’s state-owned banks continue to hold a
large  portfolio  of  non-performing  loans  (NPL).  These  NPLs  often  have  been  issued
without expectation of repayment. The biggest beneficiaries of this “free money” policy
have been struggling SOEs, which are concentrated in heavy industries like steel and
petroleum. Because of continued inefficiencies, many of these industries run at a loss.
However, the Chinese government is loath to allow them to go bankrupt because of the
loss of jobs that would entail. Accordingly, NPLs historically have represented a major
lifeline  to  these  enterprises,  with  the  enterprises  responsible  neither  for  interest
payments on these loans or repayment of principal.
52 Since entry into the WTO, the Chinese government appears to have attempted to clean
up  the  existing  NPL  portfolios  on  the  books  of  state-owned  banks.  There  remains
considerable controversy over how successful these efforts have been. On the one hand,
the official rate of NPLs has fallen significantly in the last several years, from a reported
15% in 200337 to 8.6% in 2005.38 On the other hand, outside observers have estimated
that the percentage of NPLs is two to four times higher than the single-digit statistics
now being officially reported.39 In addition, according to a recent IMF study, China’s
state-owned banks continue to issue new NPLs.40 
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53 To estimate  the  effect  of  NPLs  on  the  China  price,  a  rate  of  15% is  conservatively
assumed.  Under  the  additional  assumption  that  interest  rate  payments  on  debt
represent, on average, 3.44% of total costs, 41 this suggests an advantage of 0.52 cents on
the manufacturing dollar (with any such advantage heavily skewed towards sectors
dominated by China’s SOEs) or about one half of one cent. 
54 Third, China continues to use an extensive value-added tax rebate system for its export
industries. China’s “VAT” is imposed over multiple stages of the domestic production
and distribution process,  generally  in  the  range of  13% to  17%.  In  some cases,  the
Chinese government first collects, and then rebates, this tax for exports. In other cases,
exporting firms are simply exempted from the tax..42
55 In this regard, it may be argued that exempting exporters from payment of VAT on
imported inputs is simply a way of levelling the playing field between exporters from
countries in VAT regimes and those from non-VAT regimes. In this line of argument, an
export VAT rebate is an export subsidy. Quite the reverse: if export VAT rebates are
eliminated, this constitutes a tax on exports. 
56 Whether or not one defines a rebate as a true subsidy, there is, nonetheless, significant
evidence that the use of VAT tax rebates represents a violation of the WTO rules against
export subsidies. Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence is the fact that the
Chinese  government  voluntarily  suspended  the  VAT  tax  rebate  in  a  number  of
industries, including most prominently semiconductors, after threats from the United
States of filing WTO complaints.43.
57 In the cost structure of US manufacturers, value-added represents 35.8% of the current-
dollar gross output of the manufacturing sector.44 Assuming an average VAT rate of
15%, this suggests a tax benefit of 5.4 cents to the China price dollar. 
58 The analysis yields, then, a total contribution of export subsidies to the China price of
7.3 cents. As with many of the estimates in this analysis, it is likely to be a conservative
estimate as it does not include other possible sources of subsidies such as other forms
of tax relief, “government contracts with payments well below costs and privileged use
and retention of foreign exchange earned from exports.”45 
Driver #6: Industrial network clustering 
National and regional economies tend to develop,
not in the isolated industries, but in clusters of
industries related by buyer-supplier links,
common technologies, common channels or
common customers. The economies of the Pearl
River Delta region are no exception. The region
has developed a broad range of clusters in
garments and textiles, footwear, plastic products,
electrical goods, electronics, printing,
transportation, logistics, and financial services.
The Pearl River Delta region's electronics and
electrical cluster is particularly strong and
accounts for the vast majority of Chinese
production in a wide range of industries….
Regional Powerhouse46
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59 Industrial network clustering refers to the practice of locating all or most of the key
enterprises in an industry’s supply chain in close physical proximity to one another.
Examples of such clustering abound and include Detroit as the “motor city” hub for
auto and auto parts manufacturing, New York as a financial centre, Silicon Valley as a
nexus for technology, and so on. What is different about industrial network clustering
in China is not just its large scale and broad scope. It is also the emergence of a myriad
of “supply chain cities” that focus on a single product or set of products and serve as
the focal points for highly localised supply chains.47
60 For example, in the Pearl River Delta area of China, the city of Huizhou has emerged as
the world’s largest producer of laser diodes and a leading DVD producer. Foshan and
Shunde are major hubs for appliances like washing machines, microwave ovens, and
refrigerators. Dongguan’s Qingxi Township is one of the largest computer production
bases  in  China.  Hongmei  focuses  on  textile-  and  leather-related  products,  Leilu  on
bicycles, Chencun on flowers, Yanbu is the underwear capital, and so on.48 
61 This  type  of  localisation  of  industrial  focus  generates  significant  production  and
distribution benefits as it speeds both physical and information flows and extends “just
in time” principles to the entire supply chain. In this regard, China’s unique form of
industrial network clustering is quite different from the “just in time” form of supply
chain management that triggered the vaunted Japanese miracle of the last century. 
62 In the Japanese model, the various parts necessary for production arrive from all over
the world literally just in time for assembly and manufacturing. Chinese enterprises,
often with the synergistic and catalytic help of FDI, have taken this system one level
higher by quickly transforming whole cities and towns and tens of thousands of acres
of “green field” farmland into industrial production sites. In this model, Chinese
manufacturers do not have to rely on an elaborate and globally dispersed supply chain
like the Japanese. Instead, many of the various factors of production are located in
close proximity to each other in any given industrial network cluster. 
63 Figure 1 illustrates the well-known toy cluster in Guangdong province. Virtually every
single  factor  needed for toy production is  produced in very close  proximity to  the
major toy manufacturers. These factors range from packaging, plastic parts, paint and
label printing to springs, screws and nuts, soft filling and synthetic hair. 
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Figure 1. The Toy Cluster of Guangdong Province
64 In  terms  of  direct  cost  reduction  benefits  to  the  China  price,  clustering  reduces
transportation costs by locating factors of production closer to one another. It reduces
inventory costs by speeding up throughput times. It reduces “line down time” costs
caused by broken links in the supply chain, e.g., a firm lacking a key input is able to
secure that input more quickly. 
65 Indirectly,  network  clustering  also  generates  significant  positive  information
externalities in the form of technology spillovers, knowledge sharing among
competitors,  and  the  localised  flow  of  industry  information.  Firms  likewise  face
reduced search costs  while  infrastructure costs  to  both private enterprises  and the
government  are  reduced  because  of  the  compactness  of  the  supply  chain  and
production grids. 
66 Case analyses of the air conditioner and tannery industries conducted as part of the
China price Project suggest that the direct benefits of network clustering alone lead to
a 10% to 16% reduction in fixed and operating costs.49 Assuming that raw materials
represent 46% of the manufacturing dollar,50 this suggests savings in the range of 5.4
cents to 8.6  cents per manufacturing dollar from the direct  cost  reduction benefits
alone. 
Driver # 7: The catalytic role of FDI
[A]s capital floods in and modern plants are built
in China, efficiencies improve dramatically. The
productivity of private industry in China has
grown an astounding 17% annually for five
years….
Business Week51
 [A] major driver of Chinese productivity gains
has been the rapid growth of foreign and foreign-
invested firms. These ventures represent foreign
direct investment―long-term investments in the
Chinese economy that are directly managed by a
foreign entity. Close oversight of these operations
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by experienced foreign managers provides for the
transfer of modern technical and managerial
techniques, leading to higher productivity levels.
In fact, joint ventures of foreign companies with
Chinese firms are seven times as productive as
state-owned operations and over four times as
productive as domestically run private
enterprises.
The US Conference Board52
67 Among developing nations,  China has  become the leading destination of  FDI.  Since
1983, FDI has grown from less than US$1 billion a year to over US$60 billion. 72% of
China’s FDI targets manufacturing.
68 Of China’s FDI 20% to 30% is estimated to be of domestic origin. It is the result of the
“round tripping” of mainland Chinese capital, primarily through Hong Kong (and also
the Virgin Islands). This round tripping is driven by the special preferences awarded to
FDI  in  the  form  of  lower  tax  rates,  land-use  rights  and  subsidies,  administrative
support, and other subsidies (most of which represent violations of the WTO) as well as
by a desire to evade foreign exchange controls.53
69 Other major FDI participants include the United States, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. While
the availability of cheap labour and the allure of China’s large and largely untapped
consumer  market  certainly  play  a  major  role  in  attracting  these  participants,  lax
environmental and health and safety regulatory regimes synergistically factor into the
FDI  decision.  In  this  regard,  multinationals  are  increasingly  being  criticised  within
China for exporting their pollution to the mainland. 
70 In addition, China’s undervalued currency also provides considerable FDI synergy. An
undervalued yuan makes Chinese assets appear relatively cheap to foreign investors.
71 China’s catalytic FDI provides a variety of competitive benefits. It finances the transfer
of  the  most  technologically  advanced  production  and  process  technologies.  It  has
brought with it managerial best practices and skills as many FDI-financed enterprises
are  managed  by  foreign  talent.  FDI  is  also  often  tied  to  the  improvement  of  both
marketing and distribution skills. When all of these attributes are tied to one of the
least expensive labour forces in the world, FDI becomes a powerful competitive driver.
72 While identifying the many benefits of FDI qualitatively is relatively straightforward,
quantifying those benefits regarding the China price is inherently more difficult and
therefore, of all of the China price drivers analysed, this is the most speculative. The
approach  taken  begins  with  the  observation  that  FDI  has  played  a  key  role  in
generating the robust rates of productivity growth observed in China. Various sources
place this rate in the range of 8.5% annually since 2000.54 This compares to a rate of
4.9% in the US manufacturing sector over a similar time period.55 However, China’s rate
is also likely to be much higher in industries where FDI has been particularly heavy.
73 Consider China’s textile industry. It has been the largest purchaser of both new shuttle-
less looms and spinning equipment in recent years, much of it paid for with FDI. The
result is that Chinese textile workers now enjoy similar rates of high productivity as US
textile workers.56
74 In  labour  markets  characterised  by  the  lack  of  surplus  labour,  productivity  gains
normally  translate  into  wage  increases  rather  than  price  reductions.  However,  in
The Economics of the “China Price”
China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006
15
China, there is little evidence other than some minor wage inflation in the coastal areas
to suggest that the decreases in production costs from increases in productivity are
being offset by rising labour costs. It follows that China’s annual productivity gains are
providing Chinese enterprises either with the opportunity to lower prices or monetise
the productivity gains as increased profits.
75 Additional evidence suggests that China’s productivity gains are likely being translated
into price maintenance or price reductions rather than in the distribution of profit.
Rates of return on capital are relatively low in China on a risk-adjusted basis.57 There is
also  growing  surplus  capacity  in  many  industries  and  intense  competition  among
Chinese firms―often all the more intense because of network clustering. 
76 Based on these observations, it is possible to first surmise that some fraction of China’s
rapid productivity growth is being driven by FDI. This is a finding consistent with the
work of Yu Chen and Sylvie Démurger (2002), who found a clear link between higher
rates of productivity and FDI.58 What is interesting here, however, is that such rapid
labour productivity growth alone is unlikely to have a sizeable effect on the China price
precisely because labour costs are so low, e.g., an 8.5% rise in productivity would lower
the China price by less than half a cent on the manufacturing dollar in any given year.
77 It is highly unlikely, however, that the productivity gains from catalytic FDI are being
limited to a single factor of production, i.e. labour. Rather, a more realistic assumption
is that FDI has provided a spur to total factor productivity growth. That is, in a “KLEMS
model framework”, FDI allows Chinese manufacturers to use all four major factors of
production―capital, labour, energy and raw materials―more efficiently.59
78 Under the conservative assumption that the rate of total factor productivity growth is
comparable to the rate of labour productivity growth in China, one can postulate a net
annual gain in total factor productivity of 3.6% relative to US manufacturers. If one-
quarter to one-half  of  this  productivity gain is  attributable to FDI,  this  suggests an
annual recurring benefit of 0.9 to 1.8 cents on the manufacturing dollar, modest in any
one year but arguably quite significant over time as benefits compound. 
Driver #8: A chronically undervalued currency
 China's undervalued currency encourages
undervalued Chinese exports to the US and
discourages US exports because US exports are
artificially overvalued. As a result, undervalued
Chinese exports have been highly disruptive to
the US and to other countries as well, as
evidenced by trade remedy statistics. 
US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission60 
Greater scope for market forces to determine the
value of the RMB would also reduce an important
distortion in the Chinese economy, namely, the
effective subsidy that an undervalued currency
provides for Chinese firms that focus on
exporting rather than producing for the domestic
market. 
US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke61
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79 Since 1994, China has pegged its currency, the yuan, to the US dollar at roughly an 8-
to-1 ratio. Under pressure from the United States and the international community,
China  adopted a  “managed  float”  regime  in  2005  based  on  a  market  basket  of
currencies. For all practical purposes, however, the dollar peg remains intact; and the
yuan  remains,  by  most  estimates,  considerably  undervalued.  Table  4  provides  a
representative sample of  some of the more credible estimates of the degree of  this
undervaluation, as well as the estimation methods used.62, 63 
 
Table 4: Chinese Yuan Versus U.S Dollar Undervaluation Estimates
80 To calculate the effect of an undervalued currency on the China price, this analysis will
use a mid-range estimate of 20%. Note that even such a mid-range estimate is highly
speculative;  and despite  numerous  studies,  the  question  of  the  extent  of  the  exact
subsidy remains equally speculative. (Those who take the view that China’s currency
may be closer to fair value than many studies suggest rightfully point out that Chinese
exports remained highly competitive internationally even in the late 1990s, when all
estimates suggested that the yuan was overvalued.) 
81 In  this  calculation,  a  common  error  is  to  assign  a  “one-to-one”  correspondence
between the degree of undervaluation and the cost advantage to exporters. However, it
is critical to also take into account the import  content of exports.  Any benefits from
selling exports with an undervalued currency will  be at least partially offset by the
need  to  buy  from  foreigners  the  raw  materials,  electronic  components,  and  other
imported inputs used in the manufacturing process with that same weak currency.
82 The import  content of  most  Chinese manufactured goods has been estimated to be
quite high, which substantially mutes the currency effect. Lawrence Lau (2003)64 and
William Overholt (2003) suggest that this content is in the range of 75%.65 Based on this
estimate and an assumption of a currency undervaluation of 20%, the contribution of
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an undervalued currency to the China price is five cents on the manufacturing dollar.
In highly competitive global markets.
Summary, limitations, and strategic and policy implications
83 Table 5 provides a summary of the relative contributions by percentage of each of the
eight  major  economic  drivers  of  the  China  price  using  the  mid-range  estimates
developed in  the  preceding analysis.  Given the  difficulty  of  obtaining accurate  and
reliable data and the need for some simplifying assumptions, these estimates are likely
to have a wide margin of error. However, they do provide some important perspective
on the relative importance of the various sources of competitive advantage in China. 
 
5. Relative Contributions of the Eight China Price Drives
84 Lower labour costs account for 39% of the China price advantage and clearly represent
the  dominant  driver.  This  finding  suggests  that  more  than  one-third  of  China’s
competitive edge is driven by a “fair” advantage in a “free trade” environment, i.e.,
China’s comparative advantage in labour resources. However, China’s labour advantage
has not gone without criticism with respect to unfair trading practices. As noted in a
petition by the US AFL-CIO to the Office of the US Trade Representative, “workers in
China frequently are paid less than the country’s minimum wage, denied overtime pay,
denied collective bargaining rights and often subjected to abusive treatment.”66 
85 Industrial network clustering provides another 16% of the China price advantage, and
this is perhaps the most important area where foreign competitors have the most to
learn from Chinese manufacturers in the free and fair trade arena. As noted in the text,
the  scale  and  scope  and  high  evolutionary  form  of  this  supply  chain  management
practice  is  unparalleled  in  the  world,  and  provides  China  with  a  significant  cost
advantage. Both foreign corporations and other countries have much to learn from this
technique.
86 Five of the remaining economic drivers of the China price are those which have been
widely criticised as constituting unfair trade practices. Export subsides account for 17%
of the advantage, an undervalued currency adds 11%, and counterfeiting and piracy
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contribute 9%. Lax environmental and worker health and safety regulatory regimes add
another 5%. Together, these drivers account for 41% of the China price advantage.
87 Lastly,  there  is  the  driver  of  FDI  to  consider.  It  provides  3%  of  the  China  price
advantage―and  likely  a  much  greater  cumulative  contribution  over  time.  As
previously noted in this analysis, FDI is arriving in China for at least some reasons other
than a legitimate attraction to cheap labour and a desire to gain a foothold in what may
soon be the world’s largest and most lucrative consumer markets. One major aspect of
China’s  FDI  that  falls  into  a  grey  area  of  potential  unfair  trading  practices  is  the
widespread “round tripping” of domestic Chinese capital to avoid currency controls
and gain preferential treatment regarding such elements as taxes, subsidies and access
to land. Other aspects of FDI which are open to criticism from a fair trade perspective
include  the  desire  of  foreign  corporations  to  manufacture  under  far  laxer
environmental and health and safety regulatory regimes.
88 Future research may wish to focus on developing a more comprehensive database and
refining the methodologies offered in this  study.  Future research may also want to
better address issues of comparability and engage in a more fine-grained, sector-by-
sector analysis to determine how the China price advantage varies across industries.
Lastly, future research may want to look at the effects of FDI on the China price in a
more dynamic framework.
89 In  the  meantime,  the  limitations  of  this  analysis  notwithstanding,  this  snapshot  of
Chinese competitiveness represents the first scholarly effort to disaggregate the many
drivers  of  Chinese  competitive  advantage.  By  doing  so,  it  provides  both  business
executives and policy-makers with useful  insights  about how to respond to intense
competitive pressures in a global economy.
90 The China Price Project was conducted at the Merage School of Business from October 2005 to
March  2006  as  an  experiential,  multidisciplinary  and  integrative  class  exercise.  An  initial
discovery  phase  identified  the  major  economic  drivers  of  the  China  price.  Students  then
participated in two additional phases. The first phase focused on a detailed team analysis of each
of the eight specific economic drivers of the China price. Industry analyses were conducted in the
second phase.  I’d like to thank all those students who participated in this project.  For a full
roster of these students and the various project phases they participated in, please visit http://
www.peternavarro.com/chinaprice.html 
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ABSTRACTS
Chinese manufacturers have the capability to significantly undercut prices offered by foreign
competitors over a wide range of products. Today, as a result of the “China price,” China has
captured over 70% of the world’s market share for DVDs and toys, more than 50% for bikes,
cameras, shoes and telephones, and more than one-third for air conditioners, colour televisions,
computer  monitors,  luggage  and  microwave  ovens.  It  has  also  established  dominant  market
positions  in  everything  from  furniture,  refrigerators  and  washing  machines  to  jeans  and
underwear (yes, boxers and briefs). 
This article examines the eight major economic drivers of the China price and provides estimates
of their relative contributions to China’s manufacturing competitive advantage. Lower labour
costs account for 39% of the China price advantage. A highly efficient form of production known
as  “industrial  network  clustering,”  together  with  catalytic  foreign  direct  investment,  add
another 16% and 3%,  respectively.  The remainder of  the China price  advantage is  driven by
elements  challenged  as  unfair  trade  practices  by  foreign  competitors.  These  include  export
subsides, which account for 17% of the advantage, an undervalued currency (11%), counterfeiting
and piracy (9%), and lax environmental and worker health and safety regulatory regimes (5%). 
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